The issues of Tax avoidance and evasion are never far from the news. The Panama Papers may well lead to the hacking of equivalent firms in other jurisdictions and the exposure of practices while not illegal may well be deeply problematic at a societal level. We know from the Panama Papers of some criminal activity such as that associated with the Brinks Matt robbery. At the same time, although the clamour for action runs high for a while, the detailed work needed to tackle the global nature of the problem ensures that the details of this and future scandals will have largely faded from memory before any fruit is borne. A sense of injustice and “one rule for the rich” will, however, likely fester for longer. We now know in far more detail some of the mechanisms by which the London Property market has been distorted by front companies whose real owners are difficult or near impossible to ascertain.

The grey areas between tax avoidance and aggressive tax evasion are difficult to co-ordinate and implement when governments compete over tax rates and allowances.

Could a solution be found in the tax system? If society values transparency and fairness, then the use of the tax system to provide a level of deterrence is a legitimate economic tool.

What I propose is that if UK property is registered in a country that does not provide the level of transparency required by the UK authorities, then that property should attract an annual tax based on the asset value in exchange for the lack of transparency. For instance, the annual tax could be introduced at 2% and increased by 1% annually till it reached 5% per annum. This would enable existing owners to get their “houses in order” before the tax bites and provide a deterrence for future buyers, a price effectively for non-compliance.

Of course, there will be cases where, for instance, a “stooge” is named as a front for criminal or other persons or organisations. In this case, existing legislation on proceedings from criminal activity could provide an ultimate sanction should this be proven.

My aim in suggesting such an approach is that it does not make it illegal to use such mechanisms with all the problems associated with the legal drafting and compliance. Rather, the focus is on providing a societal price to pay for a lack of transparency and secrecy.

The suggestion of direct rule of the British “Treasure Islands” in comparison would take a long time to enact with many unforeseeable consequences. Similarly, global treaties would also take time to agree and implement. Any new rules would soon be challenged given the ingenuity of some of the “actors” in the system. Where an individual wishes to retain privacy for legitimate reasons, whatever they may be, they should recognise that society has a right to demand a price for that privilege.

The magazine Private Eye has built a significant map of the use of tax havens for the ownership of UK property. The sense that this has mushroomed in the recent past and needs to be tackled, I suspect, will not go away.

I think deterrence is a pragmatic way forward.